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The plaintiff/appellant, Gary Hunt, submits this 
Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
There is one issue on appeal in this case: Are there 
material issues of fact regarding whether ESI designed the 
transfer conveyor which injured Gary Hunt? Within that main 
issue are three subissues: 1) whether there was a design defect 
in the transfer conveyor initially designed by ESI; 2) whether 
there was a substantial alteration in that design; and 3) 
regardless of any substantial alteration, whether the original 
design defect was a proximate case of Hunt's injury. 
ESI argues that, of those three subissues, only the 
proximate cause issue was raised by Hunt in the trial court. 
ESI is wrong. The basis of the plaintiff's entire claim 
against ESI is that the transfer conveyor was negligently 
designed by ESI for, among other things, failing to have tail 
pulley guards. (R. 74, 779). That issue is preserved. Hunt 
also raised this design defect in his Memorandum in Opposition 
to ESI Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 267-268, 271). 
The main thrust of ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the design issue was that ESI wasn't responsible for Hunt's 
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injury because ESI's design was altered in 1985 when the 
transfer conveyor was changed from an open web steel joist 
frame to a channel iron frame. (R. 593, 596, 606-607) . Hunt 
argued in his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that regardless of the change in the frame, 
the tail pulley should have held a guard. (R. 267) . 
Each of the issues presented on appeal was raised in 
the trial court and is properly before this Court. 
POINT II 
ESI next argues that Hunt presented insufficient 
evidence that the conveyor which hurt Hunt was designed by ESI 
and constructed according to ESI's design. The trial court's 
Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6 (R. 774), coupled with Conclusion 
of Law No. 12 (R. 762) are sufficient to raise questions of 
fact regarding those issues which require remand. Hunt 
produced significantly more evidence than that of ESI's design 
and how it was followed. 
The cases cited by Hunt in his initial appeal brief 
are applicable to this appeal. On the issues relied upon, 
there is no distinction between a negligent design claim or a 
strict products liability defective design claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Replying to Respondent's Point I) 
ALL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL WERE RAISED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In the Statement of Facts section of its Brief, ESI 
presents argument that needs response. ESI seems to argue that 
Hunt should be limited in his presentation of issues on appeal 
because of limited objections to the trial court's finding of 
facts and conclusions of law. ESI then lists finding of fact 
after finding of fact to which Hunt did not formally object. 
In the trial court, Hunt did object to the entire 
excessive and unnecessary findings of fact submitted by ESI. 
(R. 669-670). Findings of fact are unnecessary to support the 
granting of summary judgment. Mountain States v. Atkin, 
Wright, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). All that is required under 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that the 
trial court issue a brief written statement of the grounds of 
its decision. Hunt did object, specifically or in his 
opposition to ESI's summary judgment motion, to every finding 
of fact and conclusion of law necessary to preserve these 
issues on appeal. Hunt's written memorandum in opposition to 
ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment preserves his objection to 
the only issue relevant to this appeal: the trial court's 
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conclusion of law that "the plaintiff was not injured by the 
transfer conveyor designed by ESI." (R. 766). 
Also in the Statement of Facts section of its Brief, 
ESI claims that the "tracking" of the transfer conveyor, 
allegedly caused by a bent frame, and not the design of the 
conveyor, was the cause of Hunt's injury. First, it is disputed 
whether Hunt was taking action to correct excessive tracking 
when he was hurt. Hunt raised these disputed facts in the 
trial court. (R. 269, 668). Second, even if Hunt were taking 
action to correct excessive tracking, that doesn't defeat his 
claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Hall 
v. Blackman, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). Hunt's 
theory is that the design defect of no tail pulley guard was 
the significant contributing cause of his injury. This issue 
was specifically raised by Hunt in the trial court: 
The bend in the conveyor frame issue raised 
by ESI is a red herring. The tail pulley 
should have had a guard and a kill switch 
whether or not a frame was of a web joist 
style or was slightly bent in construction. 
(R. 270, n. 1) . 
It is for the jury to allocate fault and causation. 
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). 
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As stated above, there is one main issue on appeal in 
this case: Did the trial court err in concluding that no 
material issues of fact existed on Hunt's claim that ESI 
designed the transfer conveyor which injured him? Within that 
main issue on appeal are three subissues: 1) whether there was 
a design defect in the transfer conveyor as designed by ESI; 
2) whether there was a substantial alteration in that design; 
and 3) whether that design defect was a proximate cause of 
Hunt's injury. As stated above in Hunt's initial Brief, all of 
these issues are fact questions for the jury. Soler v. 
Castmaster Division of HPM Corp. 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 
(1984). ESI acknowledges that the causation issue was raised 
in the trial court. The trial court specifically concluded 
that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a tail 
pulley guard would have prevented the injuries suffered by 
Hunt. (R. 762) . ESI argues, however, that the first two 
subissues were not raised in the trial court and cannot now be 
raised on appeal. ESI is wrong. 
The first subissue is whether there was a design 
defect in the transfer conveyor designed by ESI. While Hunt 
alleged a number of design defects in his complaint, those 
defects are limited to one for purposes of this appeal: the 
failure to have a tail pulley guard on the transfer conveyor. 
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This issue was raised a number of times in the trial court. 
First, the plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint specifically 
alleges this design defect. (R. 73-76). This design defect was 
again specifically raised in Hunt's Memorandum in Opposition to 
ESI's Motion for Summary Judgment. In his opposition 
memorandum, Hunt stated: 
Gary was hurt on the unguarded tail 
pulley of the transfer conveyor. (R. 268) . 
. . .The ESI drawing had no guard around 
the tail pulley; the transfer conveyor as 
built had no guard around the tail pulley. 
(R. 267). 
The trial court's Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6 further 
evidence that this design defect was raised in the trial court. 
Finding of Fact No. 5 states: 
Engineering Associates, Inc. an engineering 
firm now know by the name of ESI Engineer-
ing, Inc. was retained in May of 1982 to 
provide engineering design of the salt 
washing facilities at the Salt Wash Plant, 
including conveyors. (R. 774). 
Finding of Fact No. 6 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
ESI Engineering prepared two drawings that 
depicted the transfer conveyor. . . .ESI's 
drawings of the transfer conveyor also did 
not include a tail pulley guard. (R. 774). 
Based on these references to the trial court record, 
ESI's argument that the design defect issue was not raised in 
the trial court is without merit. That issue is properly 
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before this Court and is an issue for the jury. Campbell v. 
General Motors Corp., 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 649 P.2d 224 (1982). 
ESI next argues that the issue of whether there was a 
subsequent substantial alteration in ESI's design of the 
transfer conveyor was not raised in the trial court. This is 
an interesting argument because the subsequent alteration of 
the transfer conveyor was an issue on which ESI based its 
summary judgment motion. (R. 593, 596, 606-607). ESI can't 
have it both ways. ESI can't base portions of its motion for 
summary judgment on the subsequent alteration of the transfer 
conveyor designed by ESI and then argue on appeal that the 
subsequent alteration issue was not raised in the trial court. 
As more fully explained in his initial Brief, Hunt's 
argument on appeal is that any subsequent alteration of the 
transfer conveyor was not "substantial" from a liability stand-
point and that, even if the alteration is deemed "substantial," 
ESI's negligence in the original design defect of no tail 
pulley guard makes ESI liable for Hunt's injury. 
This subsequent alteration issue was specifically 
raised by Hunt in his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. ESI argued in the trial court that the 
1985 change in the transfer conveyor frame from an open web 
steel joist frame to a channel iron frame was a substantial 
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alteration in its design, relieving it of liability. (R. 593, 
596, 606-607). In opposition to ESI's memorandum, Hunt 
specifically raised the alteration issue, stating: 
The tail pulley should have had a guard and 
a kill switch whether or not a frame was of 
a web joist style or was slightly bent in 
construction. (R. 267, n.l). 
All issues presented by this appeal were raised in 
the trial court and are properly before this Court on appeal. 
POINT II 
(Replying to Respondent's Point II) 
HUNT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CREATE A JURY 
QUESTION OF WHETHER ESI DESIGNED THE TRANSFER 
CONVEYOR WHICH INJURED HUNT 
As set out in Point I of this Reply Brief, the trial 
court's Findings of Fact Nos. 5 & 6, coupled with Conclusion of 
Law No. 12, are sufficient to require the submission of the 
issue of ESI's negligent design to a jury. The trial court 
found that ESI was retained to design the transfer conveyor at 
the Salt Wash Plant, that ESI prepared drawings setting out 
that design, and that ESI's design did not include a tail 
pulley guard. (R. 774). The trial court concluded that 
material issues of fact exist as to whether a tail pulley guard 
would have prevented Hunt's injury. (R. 762). Although these 
findings and conclusions are sufficient to reverse the trial 
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court and remand this case to a jury, Hunt presented additional 
evidence to support his position on appeal. 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to ESI's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Hunt presented deposition evidence that: 1) 
ESI was hired by Lake Point because of ESI's expertise in 
conveyor design. (R. 268); 2) Lake Point received, from ESI, 
blueprints showing the transfer conveyor design. (R. 268) ; 3) 
Lake Point used the ESI blueprint to fabricate the transfer 
conveyor. (R. 267-268); 4) that blueprint design had no guard 
on the tail pulley. (R. 267); 5) the finished transfer conveyor 
had no guard on the tail pulley. (R 767); and 6) ESI observed 
the construction of the transfer conveyor and inspected the 
finished product. (R. 2 67). This evidence creates additional 
factual issues which require remand to the trial court for 
determination by a jury. Summary judgment was improper. 
ESI argues that the cases cited by Hunt in his 
initial Brief are inapplicable and a "red herring" because they 
are strict products liability rather than negligent design 
cases. First of all, that's not true. Second, even if it were 
true, the principles relied upon by Hunt are equally applicable 
to strict products liability and negligent design cases. 
The cases cited by Hunt in his initial Brief are not 
exclusively strict liability cases. McDermott v. Tendun 
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Constructors, 211 N.J.Super. 196, 511 A.2d 690 (1986), relied 
upon by Hunt for the proposition that a change in a product is 
not "substantial11 unless it is related to the safety of the 
product, was an action "grounded on claims of negligence, 
breach of warranty and strict liability in tort." Id. at 692. 
Much like this case, the plaintiff in McDermott claimed that 
an extendable conveyor on which her husband was killed had a 
design defect of inadequate guarding devices. Id. at 697. 
Michalko v. Cook Color & Chemical Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 
179 (1982) , cited by the court in the Soler decision, was an 
action in which "the complaint alleged negligence, strict 
liability and breach of express and implied warranties on the 
part of the defendants." Id. at 182. States Steamship Company 
v. Stone Manganese Marine, 371 F.Supp. 500 (D.C.N.J. 1973), 
also cited by the Soler court, was a claim alleging 
"negligence, strict liability in tort, breach of implied 
warranty and breach of express warranty." Id. at 501. In none 
of these cases did the court distinguish its reasoning based on 
negligent design and/or strict products liability. 
This is consistent with the opinions of courts which 
have specifically concluded that the "substantial alteration" 
theory applies equally to strict products liability and 
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negligent design cases. As recently explained by the Wyoming 
Supreme Court: 
We agree with appellee's general 
proposition that material or substantial 
alterations of a product after sale may 
constitute a defense to all three causes of 
action. Even if a product is defective, 
unmerchantable or negligently manufactured, 
the seller may not be liable for a 
plaintiff's injuries which are caused by 
unforeseeable alterations in the product 
rather than the original defects. 
(Citations omitted). In the context of 
strict liability, this defense has been 
explicitly codified in Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 402A(1)(b) . . . In negligence 
and warranty claims the material 
alterations defense is raised under the 
rubric of intervening or superseding cause. 
See generally, W. Keeton, Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 102, at 710-712 (1984). 
(Emphasis added). 
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 345 (Wyo. 1986). 
In Bingham v. Godfrey, 114 A.D.2d 987, 495 N.Y.S.2d 
428, 429 (1985), the court reached the same conclusion: 
A manufacturer of a product may not be cast 
in damages either on a strict products 
liability or negligence theory, where, 
after the product leaves the possession and 
control of the manufacturer, there is a 
subsequent modification which substantially 
alters the product and is the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
(Emphasis added). 
These cases specifically address the issues on appeal 
in this case and support Hunt's position. These cases 
acknowledge that the "subsequent substantial alteration" 
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doctrine applies to negligent design cases. Whether there was 
a "substantial alteration" in ESI's design which would absolve 
ESI from liability is a jury question. Soler v. Castmaster 
Division of HPM Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225, 1234 (1984). 
The Ogle and Bingham cases also acknowledge the 
exceptions to that defense relied upon by Hunt on appeal. The 
Ogle case acknowledges that the plaintiff's injuries must be 
caused by the subsequent alteration, "rather than the original 
defect." Hunt argued in his initial Brief that, despite any 
alteration in the transfer conveyor, his injuries were caused 
by the original defect in ESI's design: the lack of a tail 
pulley guard. (Hunt Appeal Brief, p. 24). Similarly, the 
Bingham court stated that the subsequent modification must 
substantially alter the product and be the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries. Hunt argues on appeal that the 1985 
change in the transfer conveyor frame was not the proximate 
cause of his injuries. The proximate cause of Hunt's injuries 
was the failure to have a gucird on the tail pulley, a failure 
which was part of ESI's initial design and which existed before 
and after the 1985 frame alteration. (Hunt Appeal Brief, pp. 
12-13, 24) . 
ESI cites no cases which specifically state that the 
principles cited in Hunt's appeal brief have no application to 
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negligent design cases. As just shown, courts which have 
specifically addressed that issue hold that the subsequent 
alteration principles have equal application to both strict 
products liability defective design cases and negligent design 
cases. This is because the essential elements of those causes 
of actions are interchangeable. As stated by the Michigan 
Supreme Court: 
Like the courts in every state, whether a 
suit is based upon negligence or implied 
warranty [form of strict liability] we 
require the plaintiff to prove that the 
product itself is actionable — that 
something is wrong that makes it dangerous. 
This idea of "something wrong" is usually 
expressed by the adjective "defective" and 
the plaintiff must, in every case, in 
every jurisdiction, show that the product 
was defective. 
* * * 
In an action against the manufacturer of a 
product based upon an alleged defect in its 
design, "breach of warranty and negligence 
involve identical evidence and require 
proof of exactly the same elements." 
(Citation omitted). A manufacturer has a 
duty to design its product so as to elim-
inate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable 
injury. (Citation omitted). For lack of 
reasonable care in the face of such duty, 
the manufacturer may be answerable in a 
negligence action. (Citation omitted). 
When proceeding under a theory of implied 
warranty a design defect is established by 
proof that the product is not reasonably 
safe for the uses intended, anticipated or 
reasonably foreseeable. (Citation omitted). 
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.[I]t is inconceivable that a jury 
could determine that the manufacturer had 
not breached its duty of reasonable care 
and at the same time find that the product 
was not reasonably safe for its reasonably 
foreseeable uses. The question in either 
case turns on reasonable care and reason-
able safety, (Emphasis in original). 
Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Company, 421 Mich. 670, 3 65 
N.W.2d 176, 186-87 (1984). 
The Prentis Court is not alone in determining that 
the principles of negligent design and strict products 
liability for defective design are mutually applicable. A 
manufacturer or designer of a product "is required under both 
strict liability and negligence principles to design and 
produce a reasonably safe product." Anderson v. Dreis and 
Krump Manufacturing Corp., 48 Wash. App. 432, 739 P.2d 1177, 
1183 (1987). The difference between a negligent design theory 
and a strict liability defective design theory is a limited 
one. As explained by the Arizona Court of Appeals: 
Appellant's underlying theories as to both 
negligence and strict liability were the 
same, to-wit, defective design. . . .In 
both instances appellant had to prove that 
the tractor was in a defective condition 
and unreasonably dangerous. . . .Under the 
negligence theory a "defective design" 
arises when the manufacturer has failed to 
use reasonable care to design its products 
so as to make it safe for intended uses. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965). 
The difference between the two theories of 
liability in a defective design case is 
that under strict liability the manufact-
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urer can be held liable despite its best 
efforts to make or design a safe product. 
(Citations omitted). 
Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corporation, 23 Ariz. App. 409, 
533 P.2d 717, 719 (1975). 
Hunt understands that his burden of proof at trial on 
a negligent design claim requires proof of fault that may not 
be necessary if this were a strict products liability claim. 
The substantive legal issues, such as substantial alteration, 
however, apply equally to strict products liability and 
negligent design claims. 
ESI claims that the "substantial alteration" concept 
has no application to negligent design claims. ESI then cites 
negligent design case after negligent design case where product 
designers were relieved of liability when their products were 
substantially altered after initial design or when the designs 
were not followed. ESI can't embrace the concept when it helps 
their position and then turn around and condemn it as 
inapplicable when it hurts their position. 
In the last section of its Brief, ESI recites case 
after case to support the proposition that a design engineer 
is not liable when its designs are not followed "in an 
important particular and damages result which may have been due 
to the departure." (ESI Brief, p. 36 and cases cited there-
after). Hunt doesn't disagree with the legal principles set 
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out those cases because they support Hunt's position. To 
relieve the design engineer from liability, any departure in 
the design must be "in an important particular" and the damages 
must be due to the departure. Am. Jur. Architects § 23 (1962). 
The departure must be "so far material that it may have been 
the direct cause of the injury." Lake v. McElfatrick, 139 N.Y. 
349, 34 N.E. 922, 925 (1893). A design engineer cannot be 
liable for negligent design where "there is no evidence that 
the defects were not due to the departure from the plans." 
Dorsev v. Frishman, 291 F.Supp. 794, 796 (D. D.C. 1968). 
Each of these cases cited by ESI supports Hunt's 
theory in this case. Hunt argues that the 1985 alteration in 
the frame of the transfer conveyor was not "in an important 
particular" from a liability and safety standpoint, nor was it 
"so far material that it may have been the direct cause of the 
injury." Hunt argues that the direct cause of the injury was 
ESI's failure to initially design the transfer conveyor with a 
tail pulley guard. Unlike the Dorsey case, here there is 
evidence that the defects were due to the initial design; not 
to the subsequent alteration. 
ESI somewhat mischaracterizes the main issue on 
appeal in this case. It is not whether ESI's plans and 
specifications were followed. While that issue is part of the 
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law underlying this appeal, that is not the main issue on 
appeal. The main issue on appeal is whether ESI designed the 
transfer conveyor which injured Hunt. In addition to the 
evidence presented in the trial court regarding how ESI's 
design was followed (see record references p. 9 of this Reply 
Brief), Hunt stated in the trial court: 
Even if Lake Point failed to follow the 
blueprint in every other respect, it 
followed ESI's design in the most important 
respect, the failure to include a guard 
around the tail pulley. (R. 267). 
The issue on appeal here, the trial court's conclusion 
that "plaintiff was not injured by the transfer conveyor 
designed by ESI," was specifically based on the following: 
Lake Point originally constructed the 
transfer conveyor with the frame designed 
by ESI, the frame was changed when the 
transfer conveyor was reconstructed in 1985 
with a channel iron frame. . . . (R. 766). 
The issue on appeal in this case is based on the 
"subsequent alteration" of the frame of the transfer conveyor 
in 1985, not on Lake Point's failure to follow ESI's plans or 
specifications in the original construction of the transfer 
conveyor in 1982-83. 
The question, to be decided by the jury, is whether 
that alteration in ESI's design was "substantial" from a 
liability standpoint and even if it was, whether the original 
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design defect of no tail pulley guard was the sole or 
concurrent proximate cause of Hunt's injury. These are jury 
questions. McDermott v. Tendun Contractors, 511 A. 2d 690 
(N.J.Super. 1986); Soler v. Castmaster Division of HPM Corp., 
98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984). ESI can present no 
convincing argument why these principles do not apply to a 
negligent design clciim. As evidenced by the cases cited in 
this Reply Brief, they do. All cases cited and arguments made 
by Hunt in his initial Brief apply to this claim and the issues 
presented on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
All issues presented on appeal were raised in the 
trial court. Hunt presented ample evidence to the trial court 
to create a jury question of whether ESI designed the transfer 
conveyor which injured Hunt. Summary Judgment on that issue 
was improper. This case should be remanded to the trial court 
for a jury to decide that issue. 
DATED this M day of September, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
By: 
GLEN A. COOK 
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